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WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 The defendants in this civil proceeding refused to 
answer questions during their discovery depositions in reliance 
on the right against self-incrimination.  In response to a motion 
by plaintiff, the district court then barred defendants from 
offering any evidence to contest the plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment.  We conclude that plaintiff failed to provide 
adequate support for such a broad preclusive order.  We will thus 
remand for further consideration of a remedial order balancing 
the equities of the parties.      
 The Securities and Exchange Commission brought this 
suit against the brokerage firm, Graystone Nash, Inc., and six of 
its principal corporate officers, including Richard J. Adams and 
Thomas V. Ackerly, alleging that they had engaged in a massive 
securities fraud operation.  The district court granted the SEC's 
motion for summary judgment enjoining Adams and Ackerly from 
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further violating securities laws and directing that they 
disgorge $60,565,581.   
 Neither Adams nor Ackerly were formally represented by 
counsel either during discovery or in the district court 
proceeding.  They were deposed by telephone in 1992 on the 10th 
and 22nd of June, respectively.  The SEC's counsel questioned 
them about their roles, remuneration, and decision-making 
responsibilities at Graystone, their participation in various 
stock transactions, any gains received by them as the result of 
trading, and any compensation other than salary they had 
received.  Both Adams and Ackerly invoked the Fifth Amendment and 
refused to answer questions other than those pertaining to their 
names, addresses, current employment, and telephone numbers.   
 On October 23, 1992, the SEC filed a motion for an 
order of preclusion against Adams and Ackerly and for the entry 
of summary judgment.  On December 14, 1992, Adams and Ackerly 
filed responses and affidavits in opposition. 
 Ackerly complained that the SEC had refused to produce 
documents that he needed in order to obtain expert testimony for 
his defense.  He also offered to testify once the parallel 
criminal investigation against him by the U.S. Attorney in 
Newark, New Jersey had been concluded.   
 Adams joined in Ackerly's response and, in addition, 
asserted that he was not an equity owner of Graystone Nash, had 
only received a total salary of approximately $150,000 for the 
years of 1986, 1987, and 1988, and that he was never a trader for 
the firm.  He also asserted that given a day in court, he could 
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"deliver expert testimony to refute the Plaintiff's case" and 
challenged in specific detail various statements made in 
depositions that the SEC offered in support of its motion for 
summary judgment.  
 The SEC's motion was argued before the district court 
on January 25, 1993.  Ackerly and Adams appeared without counsel. 
The district judge advised them that they could exercise their 
rights under the Fifth Amendment, but that the court had the 
right to fashion remedies "[s]uch as to dismiss answers or to 
grant the relief of a plaintiff . . . . You understand that."   
Ackerly responded, "Only recently, sir. . . . We understand now." 
Later in the proceeding, he said, "[W]e were advised by three 
former prosecutors that you simply don't give testimony, and we 
were really branded with that idea:  You simply don't do it."  As 
to the $60.5 million that the SEC alleges was paid to Graystone, 
Ackerly told the court that "Graystone Nash never saw the money. 
I certainly never saw the money." 
 Adams also opposed the SEC's requests and made the 
following comments at the hearing:  
"[T]hese people [the SEC] have been given six 
years' worth of tax returns which clearly 
shows I made $50,000 a year . . . . $60 
million is ludicrous. . . . I believe I can 
bring enough people to make [the SEC] look 
wrong and to realize there is no case here. I 
can bring expert testimony.  I have friends 
in this business for 25 years who will 
5 
testify that as an operations manager, I did 
my duty, and that's all. . . . [A]s far as 
cooperation, I testified before our governing 
body, the [National Association of Securities 
Dealers], under oath, and that was submitted 
to the Commission, by the way.  Also, it 
should be noted that I'm the one that 
furnished almost 30,000 documents to these 
people.  So I did cooperate. . . . I didn't 
have a share in the company.  I had no reason 
to do this." 
Counsel for the SEC did not comment on these remarks, and the 
court concluded the hearing at that point. 
 A few months later, the court granted the SEC's motion 
for preclusion and for summary judgment.  In discussing the 
request to prevent Adams and Ackerly from presenting evidence in 
opposition to summary judgment, the court reviewed decisional law 
holding that a party invoking the Fifth Amendment cannot later 
attempt to defend with evidence previously withheld from 
discovery.  In general, prejudice flowing from a Fifth Amendment 
plea is borne by the party asserting the privilege.   
 Continuing along this line, the court concluded that 
"[a]llowing [Ackerly and Adams] to come forward at this stage, 
after plaintiff has deposed many witnesses and submitted its 
arguments and proofs, would load the scales unjustly.  Thus, the 
Court will not permit defendants to advance exculpatory claims." 
The judge continued:  "The affidavits of [Ackerly and Adams] 
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contain claims about their respective roles, remuneration and 
decision-making authority at Graystone.  Because these defendants 
previously responded to questions about their employment and 
responsibilities at Graystone by asserting their fifth amendment 
right . . . the Court will exclude these representations from the 
record."   
 The district court did take into consideration, 
however, the defendants' arguments as to the appropriateness of 
injunctive relief on a motion for summary judgment. Nevertheless, 
the court permanently enjoined Ackerly and Adams from engaging in 
future violations of federal securities laws and ordered them to 
disgorge $60,565,581 plus prejudgment interest. 
I. 
 The privilege against self-incrimination may be raised 
in civil as well as in criminal proceedings and applies not only 
at trial, but during the discovery process as well.  Unlike the 
rule in criminal cases, however, reliance on the Fifth Amendment 
in civil cases may give rise to an adverse inference against the 
party claiming its benefits.  Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 
318 (1976).  Use of the privilege in a civil case may, therefore, 
carry some disadvantages for the party who seeks its protection. 
 On the other hand, invocation of the Fifth Amendment 
poses substantial problems for an adverse party who is deprived 
of a source of information that might conceivably be 
determinative in a search for the truth.  Moreover, because the 
privilege may be initially invoked and later waived at a time 
when an adverse party can no longer secure the benefits of 
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discovery, the potential for exploitation is apparent.  Thus, the 
complications that may arise in civil litigation may be divided 
into two categories -- the consequences of the privilege when 
properly invoked, and the effects when it is abused causing 
unfair prejudice to the opposing litigant.   
 The Supreme Court has cautioned that the Constitution 
limits "the imposition of any sanction which makes assertion of 
the Fifth Amendment privilege `costly.'"  Spevack v. Klein, 385 
U.S. 511, 515 (1967) (quoting Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 
609, 614 (1965)).  As an example, Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 
U.S. 801, 807-09 (1977), struck down a state statute that 
required an officer of a political party to either waive the 
Fifth Amendment or forfeit his office.  The Court commented:  "We 
have already rejected the notion that citizens may be forced to 
incriminate themselves because it serves a governmental need." 
Id. at 808.  The threatened loss of a party office with its 
prestige and political influence was inherently coercive, id. at 
807, and therefore, the statute forcing the officer to choose 
between his right to participate in political associations and 
the privilege against self-incrimination was unconstitutional. 
Id. at 808.   
 The Court followed a similar rationale in other cases. 
In Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967), Spevack, 385 
U.S. at 516, and Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 83-85 (1973), 
the Court held that individuals could not be forced to waive 
their rights against self-incrimination by threats that their 
employment would be forfeited. 
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 The Rules of Civil Procedure recognize the need for 
exercise of the privilege.  Rule 26(b)(5) provides that claims of 
privilege may be made to withhold material otherwise subject to 
discovery.  The procedural rules, therefore, provide no basis for 
inflicting sanctions when there is a valid invocation of the 
Fifth Amendment.  A refusal to respond to discovery in such 
circumstances is proper and does not justify the imposition of 
penalties.  Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 608 F.2d 1084, 
1087 (5th Cir. 1979).   
 It may be seen, therefore, that dismissal of an action 
or entry of judgment as a sanction for a valid invocation of the 
privilege during discovery is improper.  National Acceptance Co. 
of America v. Bathalter, 705 F.2d 924, 931-32 (7th Cir. 1983); 
Campbell v. Gerrans, 592 F.2d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 1979); see 
also 8 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, § 2018 (1970 & Supp. 1994).  In like vein, a complete 
bar to presenting any evidence, from any source, that would in 
all practical effect amount to the entry of an adverse judgment, 
would be an inappropriate sanction.   
 The limitations on sanctions, however, do not insulate 
a party from all adverse consequences of his plea.  The principle 
that the invocation of the privilege may not be too "costly" does 
not mean that it must be "costless."  In Baxter, the Supreme 
Court gave an indication of a detriment that would not be too 
"costly" when it held that it was permissible to draw "adverse 
inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to 
testify in response to probative evidence offered against them." 
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Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318.  The Court pointed out that a 
defendant's silence in itself was insufficient to support an 
adverse decision, but that such silence in conjunction with other 
evidence against the defendant could support that result.  Id. at 
317-18; see also RAD Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 
808 F.2d 271, 274 (3d Cir. 1986).   
 An adverse party in a civil case is not prevented from 
presenting evidence to the factfinder to support his own position 
even in the absence of testimony from the party invoking the 
privilege.  In Peiffer v. Lebanon Sch. Dist., 848 F.2d 44 (3d 
Cir. 1988), for example, a school maintenance employee was 
discharged after a hearing at which he invoked the Fifth 
Amendment and did not testify.  His choice to remain silent did 
not prevent the school district from acting on evidence presented 
by other witnesses that was adverse to the employee.  Id. at 46. 
The dilemma of choosing between complete silence and presenting a 
defense does not fatally infect the right against compelled self-
incrimination.  See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 84 (1970). 
 In a civil trial, a party's invocation of the privilege 
may be proper, but it does not take place in a vacuum; the rights 
of the other litigant are entitled to consideration as well.  One 
of the situations in which that concern comes into play arises 
when one party invokes the Fifth Amendment during discovery, but 
on the eve of trial changes his mind and decides to waive the 
privilege.  At that stage, the adverse party -- having conducted 
discovery and prepared the case without the benefit of knowing 
the content of the privileged matter -- would be placed at a 
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disadvantage.  The opportunity to combat the newly available 
testimony might no longer exist, a new investigation could be 
required, and orderly trial preparation could be disrupted.  In 
such circumstances, the belated waiver of the privilege could be 
unfair.   
 Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553 (1st 
Cir. 1989), refused to permit such abuse.  In that case, the 
district judge ruled four days before trial that the defendant 
would be precluded from testifying because he had earlier refused 
to answer questions during discovery.  The Court of Appeals 
determined that "[a] defendant may not use the fifth amendment to 
shield herself from the opposition's inquiries during discovery 
only to impale her accusers with surprise testimony at trial." 
Id. at 577.  For similar reasons, the Courts of Appeals in In re 
Edmond, 934 F.2d 1304, 1308-09 (4th Cir. 1991) and United States 
v. Parcels of Land, 903 F.2d 36, 43 (1st Cir. 1990), sustained 
district court orders striking affidavits opposing summary 
judgment after parties had refused to answer questions at 
depositions.   
 Traficant v. Commissioner, 884 F.2d 258, 265 (6th Cir. 
1989), upheld the trial court's order barring the defendant from 
introducing evidence on the authenticity of his own statement and 
of tape recordings because he had invoked the Fifth Amendment and 
had refused to respond to discovery on those points.  The Court 
of Appeals held, however, that the trial court was incorrect in 
preventing the defendant from exploring the contents and 
significance of that evidence.  Id.    
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 A trial court must carefully balance the interests of 
the party claiming protection against self-incrimination and the 
adversary's entitlement to equitable treatment.  Because the 
privilege is constitutionally based, the detriment to the party 
asserting it should be no more than is necessary to prevent 
unfair and unnecessary prejudice to the other side.   
 The necessary accommodation took place in FTC v. Kitco 
of Nevada, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1282, 1291 (D. Minn. 1985), where 
the trial judge admitted the testimony of the defendant even 
though he had previously invoked the Fifth Amendment during 
discovery.  The court decided that a complete ban on defense 
testimony was not justified because the plaintiff Federal Trade 
Commission had received some information from the defendant about 
specific areas of inquiry.  Hence, the Commission had not been 
unfairly surprised nor prejudiced by the defendant's last-minute 
waiver.  The agency had been able to thoroughly prepare its case 
and was not solely dependent on the defendant for pertinent 
information.  Id. 
 In Young Sik Woo v. Glantz, 99 F.R.D. 651 (D.R.I. 
1983), the plaintiff moved for summary judgment after the 
defendant had invoked the Fifth Amendment.  The trial court 
observed that "no showing has been made sufficient to identify 
the specific facts which the defendant asserts are contested, or 
to show that third-party depositions or affidavits are, given 
good faith efforts, unavailable to oppose the motion."  Id. at 
653.  The court observed that the defendant may be able "to . . . 
rebut his opponent's case without his own testimony."  Id. 
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(internal quotation omitted).  In the exercise of caution, the 
court therefore declined to enter judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff, but instead gave the defendant an opportunity to 
conduct further discovery in order to secure evidence to oppose 
any renewed motion for summary judgment that might later be 
brought.  Id. at 653-54. 
 In contrast to those two cases and others using a 
similar approach are such decisions as SEC v. Cymaticolor Corp., 
106 F.R.D. 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) and SEC v. Benson, 657 F. Supp. 
1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).  In Cymaticolor, the plaintiff SEC sought 
an order precluding the defendant from offering into evidence any 
matter relating to the factual bases for his denials and defenses 
as to which he asserted his Fifth Amendment rights.  Cymaticolor, 
106 F.R.D. at 549.  Rejecting the defendant's contention that 
preclusion should be limited to evidence that the SEC had not 
received from other sources, the court issued an order in the 
terms the plaintiff had requested.  Id. at 549-50.   
 We do not find the Cymaticolor approach satisfactory 
because the court there did not perform the careful evaluation 
used in Kitco.  Benson also seemingly imposed a total preclusion, 
although that is not clear from the opinion.  See Benson, 657 F. 
Supp. at 1129.  In any event, the defendant's obstructionary 
conduct throughout the litigation might have had a bearing on the 
court's ultimate choice of remedies.   
II. 
 This brief survey of caselaw makes it apparent that the 
effects that an invocation of the privilege against self-
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incrimination will have in a civil suit depends to a large extent 
on the circumstances of the particular litigation.1  The issue 
has been complicated somewhat in this case by the fact that 
defendants represented themselves in the district court, although 
they had apparently received off-hand advice from lawyers at some 
point.  The decision to invoke or waive the Fifth Amendment is 
not always self-evident, and it requires serious consideration of 
the consequences.  Counselling by a lawyer familiar with the 
ramifications of a particular case and the intricacies of the law 
in this area is highly desirable, but here defendants proceeded 
without the benefit of such carefully considered advice. 
 The record raises serious questions about whether 
defendants waived their privilege by filing affidavits addressed 
to some of the same matters that they had refused to discuss at 
their depositions.  Some statements made by Ackerly and Adams at 
the hearing on the SEC's motion, moreover, indicate that 
defendants might have shifted their positions and had instead 
decided to waive the privilege. 
 Another area of inquiry that was not explored at the 
hearing was the effect of Adams' sworn statement to the National 
Association of Securities Dealers that the SEC had obtained. 
                                                           
1Not surprisingly, this topic has generated interesting academic 
commentary.  See, e.g., Frances S. Fendler, Waive the Fifth or 
Lose the Case:  Total Preclusion Orders and the Civil Defendant's 
Dilemma, 39 Syracuse L. Rev. 1161 (1988); Elkan Abramowitz & Jed 
S. Rakoff, The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Litigation:  
Assertion, Waiver, and Consequences, in Crim. L. & Urb. Probs:  
White Collar Crim. Prac. 1985 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice 
Course Handbook Series No. C4-4169, 1985); Robert Heidt, The 
Conjurer's Circle -- The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil 
Cases, 91 Yale L.J. 1062 (1982).   
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Whether that material constituted a waiver or whether it was a 
factor counselling a limitation on the SEC's request for total 
preclusion was not discussed.  The thousands of documents that 
Adams asserted he had turned over to the SEC might also have had 
some relevance in determining the appropriate scope of 
preclusion, assuming that to be a proper remedy in the 
circumstances.   
 There is a lack of support in the record for the SEC's 
contention that it suffered prejudice because of the defendants' 
belated attempts to present evidence on their own behalf.  The 
SEC asserts that the defendants' introduction of evidence at that 
late stage was unfair because it would delay action on the SEC's 
motion for summary judgment.  This contention lacks substance. It 
was the SEC itself that had set the time table by filing its 
motion for preclusion simultaneously with a request for summary 
judgment.  The SEC's motion was apparently the first indication 
given to defendants that they might be unable to present any kind 
of defense or that a trial on the merits might not be held.  If 
the SEC had wished to avail itself of a claim of prejudice --
asserting that defendants had "sandbagged" the agency at the 
eleventh hour -- the appropriateness of a preclusion order should 
have been resolved before the motion for summary judgment was 
filed.   
 Moreover, any allegation that the SEC was surprised by 
suddenly being confronted with new and unexpected evidence must 
be received with some caution.  As noted earlier, Ackerly and 
Adams were but two of seven defendants who had been sued by the 
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SEC.  Before Adams and Ackerly appeared at the hearing, two co-
defendants, Shawn M. Crane and Robert L. Rock, had entered into 
consent judgments for the disgorgement of $60,663.15 and 
$279,074.00, respectively,2 and had agreed to testify at any 
evidentiary proceeding requested by the SEC.  In addition, the 
SEC had already taken the depositions of several individuals 
whose testimony was cited by the district court in support of 
summary judgment.   
 The SEC possessed substantial evidence in addition to 
the material that Adams asserted he had made available.  It is 
apparent that the government had devoted substantial resources to 
expose the fraudulent security arrangements and to proceed 
against those responsible.  Therefore, this appears to be a far 
cry from a case where invocation of the privilege prevented the 
opposing party from obtaining the evidence it needed to prevail 
in the litigation. 
 Nothing presently in the record persuades us that the 
SEC would have been unable to present a strong case even if Adams 
and Ackerly had been permitted to testify if they chose.  The 
severe remedy of barring defendants from presenting any evidence 
from third parties was even less necessary.  The preclusion 
sanction did not "level the playing field," but tilted it 
strongly in favor of the SEC.  Courts must bear in mind that when 
the government is a party in a civil case and also controls the 
decision as to whether criminal proceedings will be initiated, 
                                                           
2The amount of these judgments stand in stark contrast to the 
approximately $60.5 million assessed against Adams and Ackerly.   
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special consideration must be given to the plight of the party 
asserting the Fifth Amendment. 
 Although we believe the remedy here went beyond that 
which was equitable under the circumstances, we recognize the 
burden that pro se representation imposes upon extremely busy 
district judges.  Obviously, the failure of Adams and Ackerly to 
present proper legal arguments in response to the motion for 
preclusion did not alert the district judge in this case to the 
factors that should be considered in directing an appropriate 
remedy.   
 We should not be understood as holding that, in the 
circumstances of this case, no remedial measures should be 
imposed.  Those steps, however, should be those that are 
necessary to prevent a party from being unduly prejudiced and to 
allow for reimbursement of any additional sums a party actually 
incurred as a direct result of its opposition's invocation of the 
privilege.  It is not always possible or necessary that such 
adjustments be computed precisely, but some rough justice 
evaluations would be in order.   
 The imposition of an appropriate remedy is within the 
discretion of the trial court.  When significant factors are not 
weighed in making that determination, however, we must remand so 
that a proper evaluation may be reached.   
 The judgment in this case was based upon a record that 
was deficient because of an inappropriate order of preclusion. 
The judgment, therefore, will be reversed, and the case will be 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
